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ABSTRACT
Who should be included in collaborative governance and how they 
should be included is an important topic, though the dynamics of 
inclusion are not yet well understood. We propose a conceptual 
model to shape the empirical analysis of what contributes to inclu-
sion in collaborative processes. We propose that incentives, mutual 
interdependence and trust are important preconditions of inclu-
sion, but that active inclusion management also matters a great 
deal. We also hypothesize that inclusion is strategic, with ‘selective 
activation’ of participants depending on functional and pragmatic 
choices. Drawing on cases from the Collaborative Governance Case 
Databank, we used a mixed method approach to analyse our 
model. We found support for the model, and particularly for the 






The rise of collaborative governance and the importance of inclusion
Public governance scholarship has made many claims that substantively better, more 
widely supported, more robust and innovative processes and solutions can emerge from 
network-driven rather than state-centric or even state-commissioned policymaking and 
delivery. For this to occur, part of the argument is that such collaborative platforms and 
processes need to encompass a wide range of stakeholders and perspectives from 
different sectors. In other words, they need to be inclusive.
Although we now know a great deal about the rationale and design of collaborative 
governance and public sector network management processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; 
Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016), the issue of how inclusive to be 
remains a vexing one for those who promote, sponsor and design collaborative processes. On 
the one hand, inclusion can be seen as inherently desirable because it may enhance oppor-
tunities for citizen participation and thus have a ‘democratizing effect’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2018: 305; Hendriks, 2008; Young, 2002). Wider inclusion may also be attractive for primarily 
pragmatic reasons – namely, its potential to generate richer deliberation and learning within 
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networks (Lee & Jung, 2018), ensure issue and opportunity coverage (Baird, Plummer, 
Schultz, Armitage, & Bodin, 2019; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Leventon et al., 2017), enhance 
discursive representation (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008), and foster a sense of legitimacy and 
procedural justice (Nissen, 2014). Failure to include key stakeholders or prevent their 
defection can undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of collaborative processes, forsaking 
valuable knowledge and resources and increasing the chance that disaffected stakeholders will 
refuse to cooperate in downstream implementation (Innes & Booher, 2018; Provan & 
Milward, 2001).
On the other hand, wide inclusion of actors in the networks that lie at the heart of 
collaborative governance processes may increase transaction costs, reduce the quality of 
deliberation, muddy negotiations or produce ‘least common denominator’ bargaining 
outcomes. There is evidence, for instance, that larger groups are more unwieldy vehicles 
for collective problem solving (Hodges, Ferreira, Mowery, & Novicki, 2013; Margerum, 
2002; Ulibarri & Scott, 2017). In large groups, it can also be quite ‘fuzzy’ who is ‘in’ and 
who is ‘out’ of the network, producing instability (Everingham, Warburton, Cuthill, & 
Bartlett, 2012; Nahon, 2011) Greater inclusion may also increase the number of poten-
tially uncooperative participants (Nowell, 2010; Scott, Thomas, & Magallanes, 2019) or 
the number of potential veto points (Newig et al., 2018). Getting to ‘yes’ in inclusive 
forums may take more effort, time and risk as stakeholders often have varied commit-
ments to collaboration, and social loafing and other forms of strategic behaviour are 
more likely to occur in larger group settings (Choi & Robertson, 2019; Feiock, 2009; 
Johnston, Hicks, Nan, & Auer, 2010). For these reasons, collaborative processes may be 
more successful if inclusion is more strategic and selective.
In this article, we step back from this wider debate about the relative merits and draw-
backs of inclusion to investigate how inclusion occurs in collaborative processes. Although it 
is obviously of great importance to investigate whether inclusion affects collaborative effec-
tiveness and legitimacy, we are better placed to answer questions about who should be 
included if we have a better understanding of how they will be included. Yet the dynamics of 
inclusion have only been investigated to a limited extent, and mostly through an examina-
tion of a single case or a small group of cases. Therefore, the central question addressed by 
this article is how do levels of inclusion in collaborative governance networks and processes 
vary both within and across cases, and what may contribute to these variations?
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we compile existing research attentive to the dynamics 
of inclusion in collaborative governance, and use that to construct a synthetic model of 
collaborative inclusion. Second, using the synthetic model to guide our empirical investiga-
tion, we draw on the Collaborative Governance Case Databank (CGSD), which is presented 
and discussed in detail in the introductory article to this Special Issue. We employ a mixed 
method approach that combines Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with more tradi-
tional qualitative analysis of case studies to examine patterns and logics of inclusion. Thirty- 
nine cases of collaboration from the CGSD were examined for this paper. This exploratory 
sample of cases contains diversity across geographies (e.g. Australia, Canada, Germany, the 
United States of America and Vietnam), policy areas (from health or aquaculture to urban 
policy and drug trafficking), number of participants (fewer than 5 to over 20), timeframes 
(from months to decades) and in terms of the sectoral composition of participants. Finally, we 
revisit and refine the synthetic model in response to our empirical findings, and conclude by 
reflecting on the limitations of the study and on future directions for research.
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How inclusion happens: past research
Though comparatively few collaborative governance scholars have focused directly on 
inclusion, existing literature from a range of subfields allows us to identify factors that 
potentially shape stakeholder inclusion. Analytically, we broadly distinguish between 
factors representing the desire or willingness of stakeholders to include themselves – self- 
inclusion – versus those factors related to the design or conduct of collaboration that 
shape opportunities or constraints for inclusion – the opportunity structure. While these 
factors are often difficult to clearly distinguish in practice, they provide a useful frame-
work for organizing the existing literature.
Factors affecting self-inclusion
To the extent that participation is not mandatory, stakeholders will assess whether and 
how to take part in collaborative forums in terms of their own perceptions of the 
situation. One factor widely discussed in the literature is trust, which is commonly 
interpreted as the ‘grease’ that allows the gears of collaboration to turn (Ansell & Gash, 
2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Bolagh, 2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Thomson & Perry, 
2006). Trust directly affects decisions about participation by affecting stakeholder under-
standing of their risk and vulnerability due to participation. Collaborative governance 
creates opportunities for stakeholder, but also poses risks that might stem from the 
potential loss of their time or resources, the pressure to commit to positions at odds with 
their own agenda, or the general unpleasantness of conflictual encounters. Trust is also 
related to stakeholder perceptions of their vulnerability, because stakeholders are only 
likely to participate if they believe the collaborative process will be managed in good faith 
and other stakeholders will not engage in opportunistic behavior (Edelenbos & Klijn, 
2007). A past history of conflict can leave a legacy of distrust that creates barriers for 
stepping into collaboration (Ran & Qi, 2018).
In addition to trust, a long line of research suggests that stakeholders are motivated to 
participate in collaborative governance because they are interdependent with other stake-
holders (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989; Innes & Booher, 2018; Logsdon, 1991; Thomson 
& Perry, 2006). Logsdon (1991) argued that organization would be unlikely to participate in 
collaboration unless they perceived ‘high stakes’ and ‘high interdependence.’
Stakeholders also weigh various incentives or disincentives to participate. Financial 
realities and considerations play an important role, as do competing demands by other 
issues and arenas (Fischer, 2012). Civil society actors, small jurisdictions and marginalised 
groups are more likely to experience greater resource constraints and thus have ‘little 
interest in participating unless the costs of engagement are outweighed by the possibility of 
benefits from it’ (Fischer, 2012). Other researchers have pointed to a range of factors that 
incentivize or affect collaborative commitment, from legislative mandates or the presence 
of legal proceedings to fears of boycotts and the desire to protect vested interests (Bentrup, 
2001; Frame, Gunton, & Day, 2004; Hui & Cain, 2018; Margerum, 2002).
The requisite resources and capacities for effective participation in collaborative net-
works are rarely distributed equally among stakeholders (Scott & Thomas, 2017). 
Differences in education and resources makes it harder for some citizens or groups to 
undertake or sustain involvement in what can often be a time-consuming commitment. 
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This difference in power also exists between organisations–for example, between small 
voluntary organisations and large statutory authorities or private sector groups (Purdy, 
2012; Huxham et al., 2000). Various studies demonstrate the difficulty some groups 
experience in entering or finding enabling environments for their participation. 
Networks may thus be captured by more resourceful interests (Fischer, 2012; Fung, 
2003) and weaker stakeholders may be sceptical about participating because they fear co- 
optation or manipulation.
Factors affecting the opportunity structure for inclusion
Incentives to participate are often directly influenced by the purpose of the collaboration, 
but this discussion leads to a consideration of how the design and conduct of collabora-
tion shapes inclusion (Bryson, Quick, Slotterback, & Crosby, 2013). Collaborative gov-
ernance arrangements are often formed to deliver pre-established policy goals. The level 
of inclusivity and range of actors involved in these joined-up delivery approaches tend to 
reflect the design and evolving requirements of the policies and projects to be imple-
mented. Individuals from different organizations might attend project meetings at 
different stages or there may be more regular and integrated cross-organizational inter-
actions (Huxham et al. 2000). Some organizations may be heavily involved in delivery 
while others are consulted in earlier phases to provide sectoral viewpoints. Citizens and 
other stakeholders might engage at different stages of design and delivery processes in 
response to pre-defined project needs and tasks. Moreover, situational factors such as 
emergencies may trigger dramatic shifts in government prioritisation and resourcing of 
certain policy areas, and may lead to considerable inflow or outflow of participants 
(Nohrstedt et al. 2017). Government funding tends to influence the nature of collabora-
tive structures and provisions for participation, representation or staff involvement, as do 
predetermined strategic goals and timeframes (Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, & Knops, 
2004). Changes in government composition, administrative structures or personnel can 
create fluctuating policy environments that may increase or reduce the number of 
participating government actors. Some organisations may cease to exist, while new 
government bodies, priorities and jurisdictional boundaries might be created (Huxham 
et al. 2000).
In convening and facilitating collaborative forums, leaders will consider that broad- 
based inclusion may be valuable in some but not all collaborative settings. Leaders 
sometimes selectively include certain stakeholders with specific skills or perspectives 
who are expected to contribute significantly, but exclude others who might increase 
transaction costs without making important or unique contributions. In situations where 
conflict is high, leadership may want to selectively include participants in order to 
increase the probability of a successful mediation. Crosby et al. (2017) argue that if the 
purpose of a collaboration is to find innovative solutions to wicked problems, network 
conveners need to develop a pragmatic understanding of which government and non-
government actors should be a part of the collaborative endeavour and when. Thus, 
collaborative forums can be designed to include as well as exclude actors and voices. Since 
Scharpf (1978) coined the concept of ‘selective activation’, it has become widely under-
stood to be a central tool of network managers (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Hudson, 
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Lowe, Oscroft, & Snell, 2007; Klijn, 2005; Klijn, Koppenjan, & Termeer, 1995; McGuire, 
2002; McGuire & Silvia, 2009; Sandström, Crona, & Bodin, 2014).
Beyond selective activation, researchers have examined how on-going inclusion 
depends on process management and leadership of collaboration. Johnston et al.’s 
(2010) simulation analysis suggests that inclusion will be less successful if conveners 
and facilitators of collaborative processes do not take the time to build commitment and 
trust and if they are not strategic about including actors who are committed. Purposefully 
building up trust and commitment over time in what Johnston et al. call a ‘deliberative 
planning’ model allows participants to engage in consensus-oriented decision making, 
even if such deliberation slows progress toward the implementation stage. Alternatively, 
Johnston et al. define a ‘thoughtful inclusion’ approach as one that focuses on including 
new members gradually who are interdependent with the growing group of collaborators.
Sustaining inclusion thus becomes an object of deliberate design and purposeful 
convening strategies (Hudson et al., 2007; Sandström et al., 2014). For example, 
Feldman and Khademian (2007, p. 320) observe that ‘creating an inclusive community 
of participation involves doing informational and relational work that brings people 
together from different perspectives in ways that allow them to appreciate one another’s 
perspectives and potentially work together to address problems’. Building on this per-
spective, Quick and Feldman (2011, p. 274–5) argue that ‘inclusion is oriented to making 
connections among people, across issues, and over time. It is an expansive and ongoing 
framework for interaction that uses the opportunities to take action on specific items in 
the public domain as a means of intentionally creating a community engaged in an 
ongoing stream of issues.’
Finally, facilitative leadership has become a key term for the purposeful management 
of collaborative processes. Facilitative leaders attract and retain collaborative commit-
ment among stakeholders by working towards smartly composed networks, fostering 
shared motivation among participants, ensuring that authentic and constructive dialogue 
takes place, and building a capacity for joint action (Doberstein, 2016; Emerson et al., 
2012; Page, 2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). Such leadership includes maintaining the 
integrity of the collaborative process by ensuring that stakeholders abide by the rules of 
the game and ensuring the ability of ‘weaker stakeholders’ to participate more fully, 
difficult as that may be to accomplish (Ottens & Edelenbos, 2019).
Towards a synthetic model of inclusion in collaborative governance
Drawing on the scholarship surveyed above, we propose a framework to shape the 
empirical analysis of what contributes to inclusion in collaborative processes. Although 
our literature review identifies many viable factors, our first expectation was that many of 
these factors essentially influence participants’ motivation to participate. Stakeholder 
motivations to participate can in turn be broadly attributed to the incentives they have to 
participate and to perceived mutual interdependence between actors. The willingness of 
stakeholders to participate is also likely to depend on their level of trust in one another 
and in the integrity of the collaborative process itself. Even highly motivated stakeholders 
may balk at participating in collaborative processes if they believe they are not conducted 
in good faith, or if they fear manipulation or co-optation. Finally, the decision to 
participate will likely be influenced by the purpose of the collaboration, which will affect 
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whether stakeholders feel central or peripheral to the collaborative agenda. We collec-
tively label incentives, interdependence, trust and the purpose of the collaboration as 
‘factors affecting motivation to participate.’
However, while we collate these factors under this categorical heading, we recognize 
that they may differentially link to inclusiveness. We hypothesize that three factors – 
relationship-building, trust and strategic inclusion – have a direct effect on inclusion. 
Drawing on Johnston et al. (2010) and on Feldman and Khademian's (2007) and Quick 
and Feldman's (2011) work on ‘inclusion management,’ we suggest that relationship- 
building is a central factor in inclusive collaborations. Relationship-building may have 
many different aspects, but it generally includes constructive dialogue, attempts to align 
stakeholder perspectives and interests, and the facilitation of joint problem-solving. 
The overwhelming salience of trust in relation to various collaborative outcomes in 
extant scholarship also leads us to posit that it will directly associate with inclusiveness. 
Finally, we also expect strategic inclusion (or exclusion) to have a direct effect on 
collaborative.
We expect two other factors that affect motivation to participate – incentives and 
mutual interdependence–to be mediated through relationship-building. While perceiv-
ing a need for collaboration with others may be necessary to propel initial participation in 
a collaborative process, we would expect that interdependence can only be fully inter-
nalized once one is actually engaged in these activities. With respect to incentives, our 
assumption is that while the initial perception of the costs and benefits of collaboration 
(both material and non-material) may bring actors to the table, these costs and benefits 
are not fully known or effective until one is engaged in the kinds of activities associated 
with relationship building highlighted here.
A final factor affecting motivation to participate is the purpose of a collaboration. We 
know from existing literature that the purpose of a collaboration may influence partici-
pation, and have sufficient conceptual clarity to enable valid operationalizations of this 
factor, but there is limited guidance to form the basis of propositions about how directly 
this factor links to inclusiveness. We therefore leave this relationship open to empirical 
testing. However, as discussed below, we do expect that strategic inclusion (or exclusion) 
is likely to be influenced by the purpose of a collaboration. Therefore, we operationalize 
strategic inclusion in terms of collaborative purpose.
Figure 1 shows our four factors affecting motivation to participate, indicating that we 
(i) expect trust links directly to inclusiveness; (ii) that mutual interdependence and 
incentives link to inclusiveness through relationship-building; and (iii) that we have no 
strong priors regarding the direct link between purpose of collaboration and inclusive-
ness. Figure 1 also represents relationship-building as sitting at the heart of inclusion 
management, directly associating with inclusiveness.
In addition to mutual interdependence and incentives, our synthetic model assumes 
that two other broad factors contribute to relationship-building. The first is leadership, 
which convenes collaborative meetings, maintains the integrity of collaborative processes 
and mediates conflicts among stakeholders. We suggest that it is important to distin-
guish, however, between how leaders contribute to inclusion through relationship- 
building versus how they contribute via ‘strategic inclusion.’ In the latter case, inclusion 
is shaped by purposeful ‘selective activation’ dependent upon the aims of the collabora-
tion or on external factors such as the political context or the issue at stake.
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A second broad factor that contributes to relationship-building is informational work, 
which includes knowledge sharing and joint fact-finding. We hypothesize that informa-
tional work contributes to relationship-building by enhancing mutual understanding 
among stakeholders, reducing conflict, and establishing common knowledge frameworks 
upon which collaborative groups can build joint commitment.
Finally, we surmise that time matters. Relationship-building takes time and is often 
path-dependent. Negative feedback from conflict or failure to achieve progress can 
reduce commitment and lead to subsequent defections. Positive feedback from more 
constructive conflict or positive cooperation can reinforce stakeholder commitment to 
the collaboration and reduce defections over time. Stakeholders may even come to 
perceive the incentives to participate or their interdependence with other stakeholders 
in more positive or negative ways over time.
Evaluating the model
The model presented in Figure 1 represents our initial expectations about the factors that 
affect inclusiveness based on hypotheses derived from our review of the literature. As 
noted, data for this analysis are drawn from the CGCD. Since this databank contains both 
standardized coded data across its current n = 39 span of cases as well open-ended, thick 
descriptive data for each case (supported by full-length case studies), we have chosen 
Figure 1. A synthetic model of collaborative inclusion.
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a two-step approach to evaluate the synthetic model. We first apply Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to examine the contributions that various combinations 
of factors captured in the model make to variations in levels of inclusion across the set of 
cases. We then present a more traditional qualitative data analysis to further explore 
these combinations in the context of within-case narratives selected from the dataset. The 
results of these analyses are presented sequentially below, as are the resulting modifica-
tions to the synthetic model.
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
Since the model in Figure 1 identifies various categories of factors that may shape levels of 
inclusion in collaborative networks, QCA allows us to parse the possible pathways or 
combinations of factors that are simultaneously associated with the outcome of interest 
in medium-N samples (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wageman, 2010). QCA is 
a set-theoretic method structured to handle causal complexity by identifying how con-
ditions combine to produce an outcome and the multiple pathways to it, including the 
absence of conditions in certain calibrations (Ragin, 2008).
The synthetic model provides guidance on which sets of variables to test using QCA to 
reveal combinations of variables most associated with highly inclusive collaborations. 
Nearly all the relevant variables in the synthetic model are represented in the dataset and 
since CGCD contains measurements about the state of a variable at the beginning, 
middle and end of a collaborative process, it enabled us to test the temporal dimension 
of the model as well.
To support the QCA, we first had to transform the 1–5 response scale used in relation 
to CGCD survey measures to a dichotomous one. The transformation rule, applied across 
cases and survey measures, was to code values of 4–5 for each survey measure as 1 s and 
values of 1–3 as 0 s.1 For example, the question from which we derive our dependent 
variable measure of ‘inclusion’ asks: To what extent was the collaboration inclusive? 
(1 = Very few of the relevant and affected actors included, 5 = Almost all of the relevant 
and affected actors included). The cases that received 4 or 5 on this question were 
characterized as inclusive (1) and those with 1–3 were characterized as not inclusive 
(0). There are missing data in various cases due to incomplete surveys or due to ‘Don’t 
know’ responses. In 18 cases, missing data led to exclusion of the case, as missing values 
in QCA are particularly problematic and can distort the analysis in significant ways 
(Ragin, 2008), which resulted in an N of 21 cases. While these cases were excluded in the 
QCA, they were considered in the QDA to the extent that case narratives offered 
explanatory value for common themes identified, such as the impact of administration 
change or the role of leadership. Table 1 shows the survey items used to measure each 
factor or set of factors reflected in the synthetic model.
1This transformation rule is both logic-based–given that the analytical strategy is focused on identifying factors that 
contribute to highly inclusive collaborations – and consistent with the methodological analysis of ordinal transforma-
tions conducted by Jeong and Lee (2016). We did, however, perform sensitivity analysis with the data when the 
transformation rule was modified for all variables to ensure that the rule itself was not driving the findings. The basic 
problem with alternative transformation rules is that both a looser and stricter definition of ‘inclusive’ artificially 
eliminates meaningful variation in the data and renders the analysis much less coherent compared to the original 
transformation rule.
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QCA does not permit us to test a fully integrated model that simultaneously 
incorporates all the factors that we have identified. It requires testing multiple smaller 
configurations of variables. Our initial analysis tested the association between relation-
ship-building, strategic inclusion, and trust with inclusiveness. In conducting this 
initial analysis, we were guided by the synthetic model set out in Figure 1, which 
hypothesizes that only these three factors have a direct effect on inclusion. As indicated 
in Table 1, relationship-building is operationalized by three variables: face-to-face 
dialogue (F2F), alignment of interests and values (ALIGN), and a problem-solving 
focus (PROB). Strategic inclusion is operationalized according to whether the purpose 
of the collaboration is designated as expansive as opposed to restrictive (EXPAN).2 The 
TRUST question asks whether there is trust between the core participants at the start of 
the collaboration.
Three paths lead to unique solutions, as illustrated in Table 2. Black dots refer to the 
presence of a condition and hollow white dots refer to the absence of that condition. The 
overall solution coverage is 1.00, showing that these three paths explain 100% of all the 
cases that fit the threshold established as being an ‘inclusive’ collaboration. The solution 
consistency is 0.93, meaning that 93% of the cases with the three configurations are 
inclusive. Other measures that assist with interpretation of each configuration are raw 
Table 1. Survey measures corresponding to factors in synthetic model.
Categories Conditions Item from databank: To what extent . . .
Label in 
QCA
Factors affecting motivation to participate
Incentives Q18: . . . were there incentives to collaborate? INCENT
Inter- 
dependence
Q19: . . . did the participants feel mutually dependent on each other 
for fulfilling their ambitions?
DEPEND





Q10: . . . was the collaboration driven by any of the following 






Convener Q32: . . . was the leadership effective in convening . . . the relevant 
actors?
CONVENE
Steward Q33: . . . was the leadership effective in guarding the focus and 
integrity of the collaborative process?
STEWARD
Mediator Q34: . . . was the leadership effective in resolving or mitigating 
conflicts between actors?
MEDIATOR
Catalyst Q35: . . . was the leadership effective in creating and realizing concrete 






Q38: To what extent did the participants engage in face-to-face 




Q42: To what extent did the collaborative process focus on the 











Q40: To what extent did the participants . . . invest in joint fact finding? FACTFIND
Knowledge 
sharing
Q41: To what extent did the participants . . . invest in knowledge 
sharing?
KNOW
2We reasoned that if the purpose of the collaboration is to increase effectiveness, to increase legitimacy and support or to 
contain conflict, selective activation will be more inclusive (e.g., expansive), while if the purpose of the collaboration is 
to develop regulatory frameworks, foster creative innovative solutions or increase efficiency, selective activation will be 
more selective (e.g., restrictive).
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coverage (the proportion of instances of the outcome that exhibit that combination of 
conditions) and raw consistency (the portion of cases consistent with expected outcome). 
Urueña and Hidalgo (2016) suggest that raw consistency ought to be above 0.80 and raw 
coverage higher than 0.25 for a solution path to be informative. Two of our solutions 
meet these thresholds, as explained in detail below.
The first solution shows that relationship-building variables (F2F, ALIGN, PROB) + 
expansive inclusion (EXPAN) – all at the END PERIOD – are associated with high 
inclusion at the END PERIOD in 54% of cases. The second solution finds that the 
alignment of values/interests (ALIGN) and problem-solving (PROB) are associated 
with high inclusion in 31% of the cases, even in the absence of trust (TRUST) or an 
expansive inclusion strategy (EXPAN). The third solution does not meet the unique 
coverage threshold of 0.25, though it makes logical sense in that it mirrors the finding of 
the second solution: alignment and problem-solving may be less important when 
building on a base of trust and when pursuing a strategy of wide inclusion. Overall, 
these solutions stress that two variables–the alignment of values/interests (ALIGN) and 
problem-solving (PROB)–are consistently associated with inclusive collaborations. 
However, strategic inclusion (EXPAN) is also an important factor in explaining 
inclusion.
These findings reinforce the importance of Feldman and Khademian's (2007) and 
Quick and Feldman's (2011) conception of inclusion management as relationship- 
building, while also supporting research about the strategic nature of inclusion (e.g., 
Klijn et al., 1995). These findings also generally support the viewpoint advanced in much 
of the collaborative governance literature that the interactive engagement of stakeholders 
to jointly define problems and solutions is crucial to collaborative success (Bryson et al., 
2013; Emerson et al., 2012; Nowell, 2010). The association of alignment and problem- 
solving with inclusion suggests that the inclusion of stakeholders depends on whether the 
collaborative process effectively brings them together to engage in joint problem-solving.
If relationship-building factors matter so much for inclusive collaborations, what 
factors are associated with relationship-building? Our model theorizes that incentives, 
interdependence, leadership and information work will be important. We examined the 
association of these factors by treating the relationship-building variables (F2F, ALIGN, 
and PROB) as the dependent variables in subsequent analyses. We examined each of the 
relevant combinations of factors on each of the variables within the relationship-building 
category and were generally unable to identify clear pathways for the F2F dialogue 
components of relationship-building. We did, however, identify solutions that contribute 
Table 2. Configurations contributing to inclusiveness in collaborations.
1 2 3
TRUST ○ ●
F2 F ● ○
ALIGN ● ● ○
PROB ● ● ○
EXPAN ● ○ ●
Raw coverage 0.538462 0.307692 0.153846
Unique coverage 0.538462 0.307692 0.153846
Consistency 0.875000 1.000000 1.000000
Solution coverage 1.000000 Solution consistency 0.928571
Frequency cut-off 1 Consistency cut-off 0.8
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to the alignment of values and interests (ALIGN) and problem-solving (PROB) compo-
nents of relationship-building.
The solution with respect to the alignment of interests and values (ALIGN) produced 
a number of pathways, as presented in Table 3. Only solutions 2 and 3 pass the threshold 
of > 0.25 raw coverage and thus will be interpreted. Solution 2 informs us that inter-
dependence (DEPEND) is associated with the high alignment of values and interest 
(ALIGN) in collaborative governance. Solution 3 tells us that when interdependence is 
absent, convening leadership and joint fact-finding are important. Knowledge-sharing 
(KNOW) and Incentives (INCENT) each appear in one solution, but these solution do 
not pass the coverage threshold. Overall, the analysis in Table 3 indicates that inter-
dependence is an important factor in the alignment of interests and perspectives; where it 
does not exist or is less visible, convening leadership and joint fact-finding can substitute 
for this interdependence. The fact that convening leadership and joint fact-finding can 
partially compensate for mutual interdependence suggests that there are different lever-
age points within the collaborative process for achieving effective stakeholder alignment 
and problem-solving.
The equivalent solutions with respect to problem-solving (PROB) are presented in 
Table 4. Only solution 3 of the configurations passes the threshold of > 0.25 raw coverage 
and merits interpretation. The solution tells us that when interdependence is absent, 
mediating leadership, knowledge sharing and joint fact-finding are associated with 
a focus on problem-solving in the collaboration. This finding is similar to the one for 
the alignment of interests and values (ALIGN): leadership and information work can 
compensate for the absence of interdependence. Whereas alignment requires leadership 
that brings actors together (convening leadership), problem-solving requires leadership 
that mediates conflicts and differences (mediating leadership). Information work, includ-
ing both knowledge sharing and joint fact-finding, is also needed.
These findings complement Johnston et al.’s (2010) notions of deliberative planning 
and thoughtful inclusion in the sense that they emphasize that purposeful facilitative 
leadership is an important shaper of inclusion. They are also close in spirit to Gray’s 
(1989) classic statement about collaboration, which emphasized the importance of both 
establishing common problem definitions based on stakeholder interdependence and on 
the value of convening leadership to bring stakeholders together. The joint fact-finding 
and knowledge-sharing results support Feldman and Khademian (2007) notion of the 
Table 3. Configurations contributing to alignment of values and interests in collaborations.
1 2 3 4 5 6
INCENT ○ ○ ●
DEPEND ● ● ○
KNOW ● ●
FACTFIND ● ○
CONVENE ● ● ○ ○
Raw coverage 0.153846 0.307692 0.307692 0.230769 0.153846 0.076923
Unique coverage 0.076923 0.076923 0.230769 0.076923 0 0
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000
Solution coverage 1.000000 Solution consistency 0.846154
Frequency cut-off 1 Consistency cut-off 1.0
This is the parsimonious solution for data in the middle period of all cases.
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importance of ‘informational work’ and can be interpreted as mechanisms for facilitating 
stakeholder problem-solving (Buuren, 2009; Karl, Susskind, & Wallace, 2007).
Our synthetic model (Figure 1) hypothesizes that time is an important factor in 
understanding collaborative inclusion. To evaluate this hypothesis, we tested all combi-
nations in time-consistent and time-lagged manners. Somewhat surprisingly, however, 
we do not find any compelling patterns of evidence of time-effects in this QCA. All 
reported findings for relationship building variables as dependent variables above are in 
the MIDDLE PERIOD of the collaboration. Given that relationship-building is important 
and that relationship-building takes time, we considered this as a possible limitation of 
the analysis. The result could be attributed either to (i) there being no time effect, or (ii) 
the data inputs into the QCA do not capture the nuanced effects of time and thus an 
alternative data analytical method is required.
In summary, the QCA points to important patterns in the factors that contribute to 
inclusion across cases: both relationship-building and strategic inclusion were found to 
be important factors directly associated with inclusion. We also discovered that in the 
absence of trust and an expansive inclusion strategy, an alignment of interests and values 
and a problem-solving approach are associated with highly inclusive collaborations. 
Treating alignment of interests and problem-solving themselves as the dependent vari-
ables, we find that leadership and information work are particularly important. Finally, 
our expectation that time would be an important dimension of building inclusive 
collaborations was not supported by the QCA analysis. We now turn to a more qualita-
tive analysis to examine these factors further.
Qualitative data analysis (QDA)
The CGCD contains open-ended questions that allow elaboration on a series of colla-
borative themes, allowing us to investigate inclusion dynamics though traditional qua-
litative data analysis (QDA). Building upon the QCA findings and taking into account 
the dominant themes in literature, we used QDA as an interpretive tool to further probe 
key components of the model. We specifically sought to consider the element of time 
given the discrepency between the hypothesised role of time in the synthetic model and 
the QCA results. This iterative approach proved useful in uncovering links between 
context and the associated (pre-) conditions for collaborative inclusion.
Table 4. Configurations contributing to problem-solving focus in collaboration.
1 2 3 4 5
INCENT ○ ○ ○ ●
DEPEND ○ ● ○ ○ ●
KNOW ● ● ○ ○
FACTFIND ● ● ○ ○
MEDIATOR ● ● ● ○ ●
Raw coverage 0.153846 0.230769 0.307692 0.1538460.076923
Unique coverage 0.076923 0.230769 0.230769 0.1538460.076923
Consistency 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.0000001.000000
Solution coverage 1.000000 Solution consistency 0.846154
Frequency cut-off 1 Consistency cut-off 1.0
This is the intermediate solution for the data in the middle period of all cases.
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The QDA was framed to focus on the dimension of time that we surmised would be an 
important factor for inclusion, though it did not emerge in the logical conclusions from 
the QCA. We returned to the larger pool of 39 cases and divided them into groups of 
stable, decreasing, and increasing inclusiveness over time, which contained 17, 8 and 9 
cases respectively. Five cases were excluded due to fluctuating patterns that reflected 
rather particular local dynamics or because the case study author responded ‘don’t know’ 
regarding the level of inclusivity. The QDA then sought to build on the findings of the 
QCA by explaining the nature of specific case contexts and links between variables, 
focusing on the preconditions affecting inclusion and the process-centred factors that 
relate to inclusion over time. The QDA findings are presented below, followed by 
a selection of case vignettes to illuminate how some of these cases relate to measurement 
strategies explored in the QCA (we note the relevant variables in parentheses). All 
quotations in the text were taken from the case’s CGCD open-ended items and each 
case is referenced in the title of the vignettes.
QDA findings
The QDA broadly supports the synthetic model, but also adds insights that partially 
amend our interpretation of the QCA results and the synthetic model. The first critical 
finding from the QDA is the high relevance of factors motivating participation. We 
originally conceived of the factors as preconditions, but the QDA finds that they continue 
to be relevant beyond the initiation of collaboration: in terms of maintaining or enhan-
cing inclusiveness, it is important for participants to have a sense of their interdepen-
dence, growing trust and for incentives to remain present throughout a collaborative 
process. Indeed, the importance of these factors may strengthen over time as participants’ 
awareness about the issue or possible benefits associated with a project or its collaborative 
process become clearer.
The second critical finding from the QDA is the powerful role of context for colla-
borative inclusion. In cases where inclusion decreases or collaborations cease, it is very 
often attributable to a change in government administration, institutional arrangements 
or policy direction and associated funding commitments (e.g. the homelessness case), 
just as it may be a product of some failed aspect of the collaborative process (e.g. the 
neighbourhood renewal and aquaculture cases). Some cases suggest that very strong 
relationship-building processes can help collaborations survive these challenges or to 
reinitiate collaboration under more favorable conditions (e,g, the Blackfoot case 
described below). A change in context during the collaborative process (e.g. emergence 
of a new threat to population health or national security) can precipitate lower inclusion 
or strengthen inclusiveness at different stages.
The third critical finding from the QDA reveals that facilitative leadership can play an 
equally important role in both providing the conditions to initiate a collaboration and, 
confirming the synthetic model, to support collaborative processes over time (e.g. the 
domestic violence case below). Consistent with the synthetic model, some cases demon-
strated a key role for facilitators in relationship-building and informational work, to the 
extent that their success can support inclusive collaboration over time even between 
adversarial participants. In terms of relationship-building, the QDA highlights both 
formal and informal relational work in terms of relationship-building.
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Finally, one aspect of incentives for commencing and sustaining collaborative inclu-
sion is the connection participants have to a particular place and their shared concern for 
it to thrive (e.g. the Blackfoot case). In this regard, although financial or political 
incentives are important, community-building may also be an important driver. The 
QDA highlights that financial and political incentives can also act as pull factors, drawing 
participants out of collaborations when they feel they will gain more by acting indepen-
dently rather than investing in a collaborative process. These factors are highlighted in 
different ways in the following vignettes.
Stable inclusion: the statewide steering committee to reduce family violence
Preconditions affecting inclusion
In response to the problem of family violence in the State of Victoria, Australia, 
a Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Family Violence was established. The police 
commissioner’s leadership was crucial in initiating the process, gaining the support of 
relevant government departments and bringing non-government organisations on board 
(CONVENE). At the outset there was friction and low trust (~TRUST) between the 
government departments and NGOs. While direct financial incentives were not provided 
for participation at the start (~INCENT), the initiative was later funded and the NGOs 
had a stronger incentive to participate and influence the committee’s work (INCENT). 
The main precondition that limited the extent of inclusion, or led to the strategic 
inclusion of some stakeholders, was workability as defined by the government: only 
peak bodies in the family violence NGO space were selected (~EXPAN). While this 
presented some challenges, it benefited the efficiency of the collaboration.
Process-centered factors affecting inclusion over time
The early stage of the process focused on building relationships because service providers 
distrusted the police and because there was a lack of policy ambition and funding from 
other government departments. Relationship-building occurred through shared pro-
cesses including the co-development and co-production of policy. The openness of 
communication between the participants (F2F) established a ground rule around infor-
mation sharing (KNOW), which helped to build trust over time. Political stability 
contributed to ongoing inclusiveness, as did the continued presence and commitment 
of the police commissioner.
A key finding of this case is that trust (TRUST), interdependence (DEPEND) and 
incentives (INCENT) to collaborate grew over time from low to high. This finding 
suggests that we should understand the early phase of a collaborative process as produ-
cing feedback effects that reshape the preconditions for inclusion. The value of facilitative 
leadership, adequate funding and the importance of a stable context to sustaining and 
strengthening collaborations cannot be overstated.
Increasing inclusion: the blackfoot challenge, U.S.A
Preconditions affecting inclusion
This case shows how growing interdependence (DEPEND) between two stakeholders 
with no pre-history of mutual engagement or trust (~TRUST) led to an increasingly 
14 C. ANSELL ET AL.
inclusive collaborative process encompassing more than 20 people over the period of 
a decade. The pre-collaboration environment was described as highly conflictual, with 
low trust between agricultural/ranching, environmental advocates and government reg-
ulators, and growing pressure from outdoor recreation and development interests.
The initiators, a rancher and an environmental regulator, started out with entirely 
different yet mutually dependent goals (DEPEND): The regulator was interested in 
endangered species recovery and the rancher in maintaining his livelihood. Although 
they mistrusted each other, they were both frustrated by the status quo approach to 
management of the area. Neither could achieve their goals without the other.
Another important factor was their personal commitment and interest in protecting 
the area. There was a hands-on board of directors for the collaboration process:
[They are] the heart and soul of the [Blackfoot Challenge], they live it every day . . ., fully 
rooted. They live on the land, rely on the land, manage the land whether because they own it 
or, as government employees, they have a responsibility for it. They do not see their place as 
an intellectual position; instead they live and breathe the land. They love the place [INCENT].
Process-centered factors affecting inclusion over time
The sense of interdependence in addressing wicked problems, the growing reputation of 
the collaborative process (including a high degree of joint fact-finding (FACTFIND), 
problem-solving (PROB) and knowledge sharing (KNOW) and purposeful leadership led 
to growing inclusiveness, strengthening a sense of interdependence (DEPEND). The role 
of entrepreneurial leaders grew stronger over time: ‘These entrepreneurial leaders clearly 
helped to establish the initial collaborative efforts [CONVENE] (and) were instrumental 
in cajoling and persuading self-interested, rational stakeholders to stick with the colla-
boration long enough [MEDIATOR, CATALYST] to reap better individual as well as 
collective benefits through the 1990 s and into the 2000 s.’
As in the previous case vignette, this case further reinforces the point that the 
preconditions for inclusion (DEPEND] are likely to change over time as positive 
relationships are built. It also introduces the variable of connection and commitment 
to a place as an incentive, expressed through the description of the board of directors’ 
approach.
Declining inclusion: the aquaculture partnership
Preconditions affecting inclusion
The aquaculture partnership was created by legislation to bring together a range of 
affected and interested parties in various coastal states in the U.S.A, from academia 
and environmental agencies to industry and government, to develop aquaculture devel-
opment plans and official policies to manage the practices and development of the 
aquaculture industry. Participants felt a sense of interdependence [DEPEND] given 
their shared involvement or concern for the aquaculture industry and they thus felt 
incentivised to participate [INCENT]: ‘ . . . [P]artnership participants appeared to rely on 
each other for different types of resources. Regulatory officials relied on industry, and 
researchers, for topical expertise. Industry relied on government agencies for political 
support and authority resources.’
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Process-centered factors affecting inclusion over time
Many of the participants commented that the leadership style was conducive to the 
partnership’s generation of policy outputs [CATALYST]. They also indicated that deci-
sions were often reached by consensus and that shared informational work [KNOW] 
supported some degree of inclusion. While there was a high degree of shared work, for 
example through problem-solving [PROB], there was little focus on aligning interests 
[~ALIGN] and face-to-face dialogue [F2F] declined over time. The collaborative process 
produced some ‘positive relational outcomes’ and both formal and informal coordination 
around the partnership were cited as relevant, but inclusion still declined over time. This 
decline was attributed to an imbalance in representativeness and high turnover among 
the public officials who participated.
Analysis: understanding inclusion revisited
Overall, the results of the QCA and QDA provide broad support for the synthetic model 
of collaborative inclusion, but also highlight possibilities for refinement of the frame-
work. The QCA demonstrated that both relationship-building and strategic inclusion are 
associated with more inclusive collaborative processes. It also supports our expectation 
that leadership and informational work are associated with inclusion, albeit indirectly via 
their association with relationship-building. However, in a secondary analysis, we exam-
ined the factors that are associated with three key relationship-building variables – face- 
to-face dialogue, alignment of interests and values, and problem-solving. We found no 
particular configuration of variables associated with face-to-face dialogue, but we found 
that leadership and informational work are associated with alignment and problem- 
solving. In the case of the alignment of interests and values, interdependence, convening 
leadership and joint-fact-finding were important factors. In the case of problem-solving, 
mediating leadership, knowledge-sharing and joint fact-finding were important factors. 
Contrary to our expectations, the QCA analysis fails to show that time is a critical factor 
in inclusion, although our view is that time is inherent to the process of building 
relationships.
The QDA findings provide some support for the QCA, but also lead to somewhat 
different conclusions. The QDA largely supports the conclusion from the QCA that 
relationship-building is key to successful inclusion. Although the QDA also suggests the 
importance of strategic choices about ‘selective activation’ (who to include or exclude and 
when), the evidence was less overwhelming than in the case of relationship-building. 
Finally, the QDA reinforces the QCA’s findings that facilitative leadership and knowl-
edge-sharing are important factors in managing inclusion.
The QDA also adds an important new consideration to our model – the wider context 
or environment in which collaboration occurs. Echoing a part of the literature review that 
did not find its way into the model, the QDA found that collaborations are disrupted or 
redirected as political and institutional conditions change. Shifts in government compo-
sition or programmatic goals can abruptly or gradually change the conditions for 
inclusion. These shifts in context may partly work through their impact on trust, 
interdependence, collaborative purpose, and particularly, incentives. The QDA suggests 
that it is important to call attention to the political and institutional context of 
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collaboration: we should not expect that this context will necessarily remain stable 
throughout a collaborative process and this can deeply affect inclusion.
An important difference between the findings of the QDA and the QCA is that that the 
former found much evidence pointing to the importance of trust, interdependence and 
incentives. Originally, we conceived of these factors as ‘preconditions’ of collaboration, 
with trust linking directly to inclusiveness. However, the QDA supports the view that 
these factors should not be just thought of as preconditions, because they continue to 
have an important influence on inclusion throughout the collaborative process via their 
contribution to relationship building. They may also lead to the strengthening or demise 
of a collaboration. Moreover, they may be modified – positively or negatively – by the 
collaborative process through feedback loops.
Figure 2 draws together our empirical findings from the QCA and the QDA and shows 
how they relate to the synthetic theoretical model set out in Figure 1. In general, the 
empirical analysis provides general support for our theoretical expectations, but also 
provides more fine-grained analysis by drawing direct connections between specific 
variables used in the QCA. The QDA findings did not provide an evaluation of specific 
variable-to-variable relationships. Therefore, Figure 2 only adds relationships from the 
QDA where it provides support for relationships that the QCA did not establish – notably, 
the influence of trust and incentives on relationship-building. Another contribution of the 
QDA is to suggest the ongoing importance of trust, incentives and interdependence. We 
represent this by showing a feedback loop between the factors affecting motivation to 
participate and the process-centered factors. Finally, the QDA suggests the importance of 
the political and institutional context, which we represent as a box around all the factors.
Unfortunately, the CGCD database lends itself better to testing the relationship- 
building argument than it does to evaluating the strategic inclusion aspect of the 
Figure 2. Findings from QCA and QDA.
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model. As hypothesized earlier, we expect strategic decisions about inclusion during 
a collaboration to depend on the overall purposes of collaboration and, as was more 
clearly seen in the QDA, the context. For example, in cases where broad-based legitimacy 
is important, we would expect more expansive inclusion. Where the goal is innovation, 
however, we might expect collaboration to narrow participation to the stakeholders most 
likely to contribute to the innovation.
There were at least two limitations of our QCA analysis of strategic inclusion. The first 
is that, in our operationalization, there is really no separation between ‘purposes of 
collaboration’ and ‘strategic inclusion.’ We simply operationalize strategic inclusion in 
terms of different purposes of collaboration. Second, operationalization rested on what 
we regard as relatively crude judgements between different kinds of purposes. For 
example, returning to the example of collaborative innovation, we can imagine 
a rationale for why collaborative innovation might want more restrictive participation 
(e.g., limit participation to actors who are most likely to contribute), but we can also 
imagine a contrary rationale for more expansive participation (e.g., greater diversity of 
perspectives can stimulate creativity). Although the QDA provides some support for the 
strategic inclusion argument, we think this aspect of our inclusion model needs more 
targeted scrutiny in future research.
Conclusion
This study developed, empirically evaluated and revised a theoretical framework for 
understanding inclusion in collaborative governance arrangements. Our analysis has 
made some headway into understanding the variability of inclusion. Our findings high-
light the potential usefulness of developing a framework for distinguishing between the 
different motives and roles of both participants and non-participants.
Concerning non-participation, we surmise that there may be many reasons why 
stakeholders decide not to participate or are not invited to join. Specifically, our model 
suggests that stakeholders may not participate because: they lack incentives to do so; they 
do not feel a sense of interdependence with other stakeholders; or their involvement does 
not align with the stated strategic purpose or the efficiency of a collaborative network. 
These broad claims require more detailed scrutiny in future research.
Similarly, those who do participate may do so for different reasons. Some participants 
may wish to be included merely to monitor what is going on, or to protect their specific 
interests by acting as veto players. Others may participate out of a sense of civic duty or 
general interest in the proceedings rather than any strategic motives. Actors who partici-
pate out of a sense of civic duty may be committed and energetic, but may also be more 
likely to withdraw as the discussions within the network become more conflictual or the 
costs of participation (in time, energy, expertise, material resources) increase.
The relevance of the ‘inclusion management’ and ‘selective activation’ literatures is that 
while involvement of citizens and stakeholders is essential to make collaboration work, 
inclusion is not simply a case of ‘the more the better.’ Inclusion is an active and strategic 
process. While our findings support a ‘relationship-building’ perspective on inclusion, they 
do not perhaps capture what we might call its ‘political’ perspective in which certain 
‘difficult actors’ need to be persuaded to remain at the table and become more constructive 
participants, while others may need to be sidelined or excluded altogether.
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Thus, we need a more nuanced account of motivations and roles of participants to 
develop a deeper sense of the processes and strategies of inclusion. The same goes for the 
nature of the relationship between inclusion and diversity of stakeholders, and their 
possible interaction effects on collaborative processes and outcomes. The most important 
next steps are therefore (1) to continue the work of testing and refining the synthetic 
model of inclusion; and (2) to begin investigating the impact that variations in inclusion 
have on collaborative effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (Dickinson & Sullivan, 2014; 
Provan & Milward, 2001).
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